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THE CONSTITUTION, TREATIES, AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LoIs HENKIN t
By a coincidence of which, no doubt, few were aware, the year
1968, the centenary of the fourteenth amendment to the American
Constitution, was designated by the United Nations General Assembly
as "International Human Rights Year." 1 On such ceremonial occasions, coincidence alone might warrant the exploration of a possible
relationship between the occasions celebrated. It is in fact not difficult
to find significant links between human rights as enjoyed under the
fourteenth amendment and other provisions of the American Constitution, and human rights as they exist in other countries. The
actions of the United States have affected human rights in other
nations, as well as international efforts to improve the observance
of such rights.
While influence can never be measured and often cannot be
proved, one can assert with confidence that the United States has
inspired ideas, movements, laws, and events which have promoted
human rights in other countries. The American Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment, have left
their traces in a hundred constitutions and in thousands of laws, charters
and manifestos.2 American concern about human rights has been
exported by American foreign policy and diplomacy, in protests on
the mistreatment of minorities by Czars and Hitlers; in peace treaties
requiring the vanquished to respect the rights of minorities (after
World War I), or of all persons (after World War II) ; in the growing
protections of customary international law assuring justice to aliens;
in burgeoning doctrines assuring basic rights to all; in the human rights
provisions of the UN Charter; 3 in the UN Declaration of Human
Rights; 4 in covenants drafted under the auspices of the UN; and in
conventions and institutions of European and other regional bodies.
t Lines Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A. 1937, L.H.D. 1963, Yeshiva
University; LL.B. 1940, Harvard University. Member, New York Bar.
1 G.A. Res. 1961, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
2 Some constitutions were drafted under direct American authority or influence;
for example, those of Liberia, the Philippines, the Federal Republic of Germany and
postwar Japan. For similarities between the American Constitution and others, see
synoptic tables in 3 A. PEAsLx, CoNsTrrunloNs oF NATioNs 556-63 (1950).
3U.N. CHARTm art. 1, para. 3, art. 13, para. lb, arts. 55-72.
4 G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71-77 (1948).
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Influence, of course, has not been a one-way street. Many of the
rights protected by the Constitution owe much to French and British
antecedents. More recently, the ideas and experiences of others have
helped bring our eighteenth-century Constitution up to the needs of a
new age. Our constitutional fathers were concerned with the protection of "natural" individual freedoms from too much governmental
interference; only after a world depression did Congress begin to
provide "rights of welfare," and it was not easy to persuade the
Supreme Court of the constitutionality of such legislation.' New
rights of equality and new conceptions of freedom required constitutional reinterpretation 6 and bold legislation.7 The UN Charter and
the UN Declaration of Human Rights have been invoked in American
courts to supplement rights protected by the Constitution.' Political
forces-the existence of United Nations, the competition of Communist
ideology, the influence of new nations-surely have had an impact on
the actual state of human rights in the United States, and particularly
on the rights of the Negro.
In one respect, however, the United States has resisted the influence of others within our borders and has refused to cooperate in
promoting rights elsewhere. Although the American government has
insisted that observance of human rights is indispensable to international peace and security; although our own observance of human
rights is, in most respects, as high as any in the world; although the
United States has obligated itself to cooperate with other nations and
international organizations to promote human rights; 9 although
American representatives have played principal roles in drafting declarations and covenants advancing freedom and justice-the United
States has generally refused to adhere to international efforts to establish common minimum standards for individual human rights. The
Genocide Convention has vainly sought the consent of the United States
Senate since 1949.10 The United States did not sign the convention,
5 Compare United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), with Steward Mach. Co. v.
Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937).
6 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).

7Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat 241-68 (1964), 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1964),
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1964).

S Compare Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50 (concurring opinion), 673
(concurring opinion) (1948), with Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d 233, 245-46 (D.C. Cir.
1947), aff'd, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948), and Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481, 486-88
(Cal. Dist. Ct App. 1950), aff'd on other grounds, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
9 U.N. CEAR m arts. 55-56.
10 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78
U.N.T.S. 278, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951. President Truman transmitted the
Convention to the Senate for its consent on June 16, 1949, see 95 CONG. REc. 7825

(1949).
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which it helped draft and promote, on the status of refugees." Secretary
of State Dulles officially renounced any intention to adhere to conventions on human rights which the UN was drafting." When President
Kennedy abandoned the Dulles policy and sent three minor conventions
to the Senate, 3 the Foreign Relations Committee failed to recommend
4
consent to two of them.1

The last decade even saw a determined effort, led by Senator
Bricker, to amend the United States Constitution in ways principally
designed to make American adherence to human rights covenants
impossible.'
That effort failed, but lawyers now are endeavoring to
use the Constitution as it is to reach the same end.'
Amendment,
they maintain, is not necessary to prohibit American participation in
human rights covenants: the Constitution, they say, already forbids
the use of the treaty power for such purposes since the human rights
of American inhabitants are essentially a matter of domestic, not
international, concernm
I shall not consider here whether it is in the interest of the
United States to adhere to any particular human rights agreement, or
even whether, in principle, the United States should join in cooperative
efforts to promote human rights through conventions setting uniform
minimum standards of respect for the rights of a nation's own inhabitants. My concern is exclusively with the constitutional objections
that are raised against American participation in international treaties
on human rights. 8 I am convinced that the argument that the United
States is without power under the Constitution to adhere to such
"1Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (1954).
12 32 DEP'T OF STATE BuL. 820, 822 (1955) ; see note 69 infra and accompanying
text.
13 See note 66 infra.
'4 109 CONG. REc. 13046 (1963); 113 CONG. Rxc. 15750-51 (daily ed. Nov. 2,

1967).

15The principal version of the Bricker Amendment, prepared by the American
Bar Association, is contained in Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and SJ. Res. 43 Before a
Subcomin. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. at 35-36 (1953).
1
6American Bar Association, Report of the Standing Committee on Peace and
Law Through United Nations: Hnan Rights Conventions and Recominendations,
1 INT'L LAW. 600, 607 (1967) ; see Hearings on Human Rights Conventions Before a
Subcomin. of the Senate Comnn. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., passim

(1967).

17 American Bar Association, Report of the Standing Committee on Peace and

Law Through United Nations: Human Rights .Conventions and Reccommendations
1 INT'L LAW. 600, 601 (1967).
18 1 have dealt at length with basic constitutional doctrine about treaties in
(1958) [hereinafter
cited as ARms CONTROL], particularly in chapter III, at 25-46. See also Henkin,
L. HENKIN, ARms CONTROL AND INSPECiION N AMERicAN LAW

The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 903 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Law of the Land] ; Henkin,
The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Niagara Reservation, 56 CoLum. L.
REv. 1151 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Niagara Reservation].
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treaties has no basis whatever-in the language of the Constitution, in
its travaux prdparatoires,in the institutions it established, in its principles of federalism or of separation of powers, in almost two centuries
of constitutional history, or in any other consideration relevant to
constitutional interpretation.

Article II, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the President
"shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur."
The Constitution does not define treaties; the framers knew what
treaties were and, no doubt, did not see any need to define what was
well known in international law and practice. Nor does the Constitution state that there are matters which cannot properly be the
subject of a treaty, or that there are other limitations on treaties and
the treaty power.Y9
Still, while no treaty or treaty provision has ever been declared
unconstitutional, it is settled that treaties are subject to constitutional
limitations. There was once a myth that this was not so. The view
that treaties are not subject to constitutional limitations found support
in the language of the supremacy clause and in an ambiguous suggestion
by Mr. Justice Holmes. 0 But the question was thoroughly explored
during the Bricker controversy, and everyone, on both sides, firmly
rejected that view. In 1957, in Reid v. Covert,"' Mr. Justice Black
seized the occasion to lay that ghost to rest. Although there was no
majority opinion of the Court, and Justice Black's statement was
perhaps not necessary to his result, he stated that treaties, like laws,
must be made "in pursuance of" the Constitution, and that
19 International law and practice know no limitation here relevant. See L. OPPENBut cf. U.N.
INTmNATIONAL LAW § 501 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
CHARTEm art. 103.
20
Mr. Justice Holmes said:
Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in purHEIM,

suance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made

under the authority of the United States. It is open to question whether the
authority of the United States means more than the formal acts prescribed to
make the convention.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 provides in part: "This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme

Law of the Land. .. "
See also ARMs CONTROL 29, 169-70 n.14. The myth was repeated by John Foster
Dulles shortly before1 he became Secretary of State, but he later repudiated the statement Id. at 171 n. 4.
21354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the
Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is
free from the restraints of the Constitution..
The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to
apply to all branches of the National Government and they
cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and
the Senate combined."
From our constitutional beginnings there have also been suggestions that the treaty power is limited-by implication-by other provisions of the Constitution, by the Constitution as a whole, or by the
philosophy that permeates it and the institutions it established. Such
limitations have principally been implied from the provisions for the
separation of powers among the branches of the federal government
and the division of authority between the government and the states.2
An early statement of such limitations is found in Jefferson's Manual
of ParliamentaryPractice:
By the Constitution of the United States, this department of legislation is confined to two branches only, of the
ordinary legislature; the President originating, and the Senate
having a negative. To what subject this power extends, has
not been defined in detail by the Constitution, nor are we
entirely agreed among ourselves. (1) It is admitted that it
must concern the foreign nation, party to the contract, or it
would be a mere nullity, res inter alios acta. (2) By the general power to make treaties, the Constitution must have
intended to comprehend only those objects which are usually
regulated by treaty, and cannot be otherwise regulated. (3)
It must have meant to except out of these the rights reserved
to the States; for surely the President and Senate cannot do
by treaty what the whole government is interdicted from
doing in any way. (4) And also to except those subjects of
legislation in which it gave a participation to the House of
Representatives. This last exception is denied by some, on
the ground that it would leave very little matter for the treaty
power to work on. The less the better, say others.2 '
22 Id. at 16-17. See also ARMS CONTROL 173 n.17. Justice Black expounded the
reasons for the language of the supremacy clause that struck Holmes, see note 20
supra. See generally ARMS CONTROL 169-72 n.14.
Even the first amendment, which begins, "Congress shall make no law . . ." applies to treaties as well. See ARMs CONTROL 37, 179 n.44.
23
Various statements to this effect going back to our early history are collected
in H. TucER, LIMrrATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWxa §§ 2-51 (1915), and
Mikell, The Extent of the Treaty-Making Power of the President and Senate of the
United States, 57 U. PA. L. REv. 435, 436-38 n.1 (1909).
24 T. JEFFERSON, MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 110 (1876), quoted in
5 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 162 (1906). See also the remarks of
John Calhoun made in 1816, recorded in 29 DEBATEs AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 532 (1854).
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As the final sentence may imply, Jefferson was no friend of the
treaty power 2 5 Indeed, the limitations he enumerates leave little room
for treaties. Under his final clause, a treaty cannot deal with matters
which are within the enumerated powers of Congress. By the third
limitation, the treaty power cannot deal with matters reserved to the
states-presumably, those not expressly conferred upon the national
government or some branch of it, principally upon Congress by the
If a treaty can deal neither with matters
eighth section of article I.
delegated to Congress, nor with matters not delegated to Congress,
it can deal with very little.7
These clauses in Jefferson's manual have long been famous examples of his bad guesses, and notable evidence that ours has not become a Jeffersonian Constitution. Everyone today agrees that a treaty
can deal with matters on which Congress may legislate2 Under contemporary views of the powers of Congress, this excludes very little.
Indeed, I have suggested that there is practically nothing that is dealt
with by treaty that could not also be the subject of legislation by
Congress. 9 In practice, the treaty-makers have frequently concluded
agreements dealing with matters concerning which Congress could also
legislate, such as tariffs and other regulations of commerce with foreign
nations. Also, treaties have frequently dealt with matters which, apart
from treaty, seemed reserved to the states: for example, the rights
2 In 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNsTrrTTIox OF THE UNrnE

STATES

339 n.3 (5th ed. 1891), Joseph Story said:

Mr. Jefferson seems at one time to have thought that the Constitution only

meant to authorize the President and Senate to carry into effect, by way of
treaty, any power they might constitutimlly exercise. At the same time, he
admits that he was sensible of the weak points of this position. 4 Jefferson's
Corresp. 498. What are such powers given to the President and Senate?
Could they make appointments by treaty?
26This is the common interpretation of Jefferson's dictum. Of course, if one
recognizes that the treaty power is one of the powers delegated to the federal government, and that what comes within it is therefore not reserved to the states, one
could accept Jefferson's statement to mean that there may be some special areas reserved to the states even as regards the treaty power, for example, that a treaty cannot

cede territory of a state without its consent. See text accompanying note 37 infra.
2
7 Presumably it could deal with matters which are in the President's domain
under the Constitution.
2
8 See Q. WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AmmIcAN FOREIGN RELATIONS § 59 (1922).

The Supreme Court itself never gave any encouragement to the view that treaties
cannot deal with matters that are within the powers delegated to Congress. On the
contrary, it has always insisted that a treaty and statute might deal with the same

matter, and that, for example, if the two were inconsistent the later in time would
prevail. E.g., 3Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) ; see ARMS CONTROL 29-31,
173-76 nn.20-2 .

29
See Law of the Land 913-30. Since that was written the Supreme Court has
found additional powers of Congress in the enforcement clause of the fourteenth
amendment See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See also United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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of aliens to inherit property 30 or to engage in local occupations. Almost half a century ago, Mr. Justice Holmes, in Missouri v. Holland,"'
settled that, since the treaty power was delegated to the federal government, what is within that power is not reserved to the states.3 2 Treaties,
then, are not limited by any "invisible radiation" ' from the truism
that is the tenth amendment."' Because Missouri v. Holland finally
disposed of Jefferson's third limitation, Senator Bricker sought to have
the Constitution amended to "repeal" that case. The decision has
never been questioned in the Supreme Court, and Senator Bricker's
abortive attempts only reaffirmed its continuing validity.
Opponents of American adherence to human rights conventions
cannot, and do not, invoke the long-rejected Jeffersonian limitations
just discussed.3 5 While not unrelated to those propositions, their arguments are essentially closer to Jefferson's first two limitations-that a
treaty "must concern the foreign nation," and that it must deal with
"objects which are usually regulated by treaty, and cannot be otherwise
regulated."
These limitations, perhaps, are also implied in the
assertions that treaties cannot deal with matters that are "of domestic
concern" or matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of

the United States."
The fact that two of Jefferson's four contentions have been clearly
rejected by later interpretations of the Constitution might be enough
to dismiss him as an authority on the scope of the treaty power today.
Still, all his suggestions require consideration on their merits, and
Jefferson's first two limitations have support in other authority, including some in the United States Reports.
30o Ags CONTROL 33-34, 176 n.25, 177 n.28. Compare Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S.
503 (1947), with Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924), and Hauenstein v. Lynham,
100 U.S. 483 (1879). For the authority of states to deal with inheritance by aliens
in the absence of treaty, see Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
31252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). Contrary to some impressions, Holmes was not
making
new law. ARms CoNrrnoL 33-34, 176 n.25.
82 See Law of the Land 909-13. Even before Missouri v. Holland, 262 U.S. 416
(1920), the view expounded by Justice Holmes was that of the majority. ARms
CoNTROL 33-34, 176 n.25. On the other hand, even after Missouri v. Holland was
decided, its implications were not clearly understood, sometimes even by American
negotiators. For example, American representatives for some time continued to claim
that the United States could not undertake to regulate the manufacture of armaments
because manufacturing was local and reserved to the states. The Department of State
recognized its error several years later and officially abandoned the position in 1932.
ARms CONTROL 176-77 n.25.
as Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (Holmes, J.).
34 "Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment . . . The amendment
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered." United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941).
-35 Some of them, at least, would be particularly reluctant to claim that human
rights are reserved to the Congress. Like Senator Bricker, they might insist that
Congress could not deal with them either. But see Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat.
241-68 (1964), 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a2000h-6 (1964) ; cases cited note 29 suPra.
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In the Supreme Court, the best known statement of implied limitations on the treaty power is probably that made by Mr. Justice Field
in Geofroy v. Riggs:
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in
terms unlimited except by those restraints which are found
in that instrument against the action of the government or of
its departments, and those arising from the nature of the
government itself and of that of the States. It would not be
contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the
Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the
government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of
any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent.
: I . But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that there
is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching
any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with
a foreign country.36
Mr. Justice Field does not expound what restraints arise "from
the nature of the government itself and of that of the States." It may
be that these restraints consist only of those he specifies, for example,
that a treaty cannot cede territory of a state without its consent. '7 But
some additional limitation may be implied in his suggestion that
treaties can deal with "any matter which is properly the subject of
negotiations with a foreign country." 38
In other cases, too, there are dicta that treaties may deal with:
"all those objects which in the intercourse of nations, had usually
been regarded as the proper subject of negotiation and treaty;" 39
"all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and
other nations ;" 0

"all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign relations."

41

Noteworthy for its echoes of Jefferson is Chief Justice Taney's
statement in Holmes v. Jennison:
36 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).

37 Some even question this limitation.

See

ARMS

CONTROL

177 n.30.

Other

limitations suggested would bar the use of a treaty to abolish a state's militia or
destroy its republican form of government. Id. at 34-36, 60-61.
38 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890)
(emphasis added). The same
implication might lie in an earlier sentence in the opinion, where the Court stated:
"That the treaty power of the United States extends to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and the governments of other nations, is clear."
Id. at 266.
3
9 Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 243 (1872).
40
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924).
41
Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931).
4239

U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).

1020

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.116:1012

The power to make treaties is given by the Constitution in
general terms, without any description of the objects intended
to be embraced by it; and, consequently, it was designed to
include all those subjects, which in the ordinary intercourse
of nations had usually been made subjects of negotiation and
treaty; and which are consistent with the nature of our inof powers between the general
stitutions, and the distribution
43
and state governments.

Each of these judicial dicta, it should be noted, was made by the
Court while upholding an exercise of the treaty power. Each statement was intended to assert the fulness of the treaty power, rather than
any limitation upon it. Only the cautious use of "proper," "properly,"
"usually," and "usually regarded as proper"-each phrase probably
echoing those which preceded it-suggests some possible limitation.
There is no indication that any of the Justices had one particular
qualification in mind, or that they sought to exclude any particular use
of the treaty power. No treaty of the United States has been held
invalid on the ground that it dealt with an "improper" subject." No
treaty has been avoided by the President or rejected by the Senate
because its subject matter was not constitutionally "proper" for regulation by treaty.45 But if we are to give these judicial statements any
content, it is not unreasonable to suggest that they might support
propositions akin to Jefferson's first two clauses.
How have these alleged limitations fared in the history of the
Constitution? The second half of clause (2)-that treaties can deal
only with matters that cannot be regulated except by treaty-is
ambiguous. If it means that a treaty may deal only with matters on
which Congress could not legislate," we are back to Jefferson's fourth
principle, which has long been repudiated. Today, surely, it is difficult
to conceive of any matter that could not be regulated other than by
treaty; any undertaking having effect within the United States could
43 Id. at 569. The same statement, in slight paraphrase, appears in Holden v. Joy,
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 243 (1872). In that case Mr. Justice Clifford speaks of
"those objects which in the intercourse of nations had usually been regarded as the
proper subjects of negotiation and treaty, if not inconsistent with the nature of our
governmenut and the relation between the States and the United States." Id. (footnote omitted). If Clifford intended to modify Taney, his statement might be read
more broadly-a treaty may deal not merely with matters about which nations had
negotiated, but also with those they considered proper for negotiation.
44But cf. Power Authority v. FPC, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot,
sub nor. American Pub. Power Ass'n v. Power Authority, 355 U.S. 64 (1957).
However, this case was, I believe, wrongly decided. See note 65 infra.
45 Early in our history some treaties were rejected because the subject matter was
within the domain of Congress and therefore, it was thought, not within the treaty
power. See ARms CONTROL 172 n.14.
4
6Calhoun, too, said: "A treaty never can legitimately do that which can be done
by law; and the converse is also true." 29 DEATES AND PROcEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

532 (1854).
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presumably be carried out unilaterally by internal legislation. In practice, the United States has always regulated by treaty those matters
which it might have regulated, and did regulate, by legislation as wellthe rights of aliens, tariffs, trade, extradition, consular affairs.4 7 On the
other hand, if Jefferson's limitation would bar only treaties whose
entire scheme could be achieved by internal legislation, it would outlaw
no treaty entailing mutual obligations. Legislation conditioned on
reciprocity might effectively approximate such a treaty,4" but it would
bind neither the United States nor the other nation. Binding common
standards of international behavior, whether on human rights or any
other subject, cannot be achieved other than by international agreement
(or international customary law).
There remains the first half of clause (2)-that the treaty power
can regulate only "matters that are usually regulated by treaty." This
suggestion is also found in Chief Justice Taney's statement that the
treaty power reaches "all those subjects, which in the ordinary intercourse of nations had usually been made subjects of negotiation and
treaty." ' Again, the meaning of Taney's dictum, as well as that of
Jefferson, is not entirely clear. We do not know whether Jefferson's
"matters," or Taney's "subjects," 50 refers to the particular thing
dealt with in the treaty (wheat, nuclear weapons), the rights or duties
it establishes (quotas and prices, non-use of weapons), or its objectives
(trade, peace). If the limitation were taken seriously, would human
rights be a new subject of international negotiation? Are human
rights a subject different from the traditional rights of aliens? Or
are the asserted objects of human rights covenants, friendly relations
and international peace, as old as treaties?
But such a limitation cannot be taken seriously. Why in law,
logic, or good sense, should the United States be barred from negotiating about new subjects, or for objectives not "usually" regulated by
treaty? Justice Taney's ambiguous tense is particularly troubling. If
the implication is that the United States can deal by treaty only with
matters that "had usually been" dealt with by treaty before 1787, it is
patently unacceptable. There is as little, or less, reason for limiting
the treaty power to those matters about which nations negotiated in
the eighteenth century as there is for limiting the commerce power or
the war powers to the needs of that era. In fact, the United States
has negotiated treaties about subjects, and for objects, that were not
47
4

Q. WRIGHT, THE CONTROL oF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
See Law of the Land 921 n.41 and text accompanying.
See

§ 59 (1922).

v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840).
50 Or Clifford's "objects," Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 243 (1872).
49 Holmes
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dreamed of by the constitutional fathers (or by Taney), including the
Charter of the United Nations and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
Jefferson's assertion might mean that the United States cannot
negotiate a new kind of treaty. It would not prevent the United States
from entering into a treaty of a kind it has never negotiated, after
other nations "had" begun "usually" to negotiate about it. Such a
constitutional doctrine makes little sense for the country we have
become,"' but it would not, in fact, bar the United States from
negotiating with other nations on human rights; nations have been
"usually" regulating human rights by treaty at least since the
"minorities treaties" of a half-century ago, in the UN Charter, in
the various regional human rights arrangements now in effect, and in
the human rights covenants that have been under negotiation for
almost twenty years under the auspices of the United Nations. 2
We are left, then, with Jefferson's first limitation-that a treaty
"must concern the foreign nation, party to-the contract." Jefferson
apparently saw this as an inherent characteristic of a treaty, a characteristic which the Constitution incorporated when it spoke of
"Treaties." It is not clear what this limitation meant for him, what
would be its practical consequences, what kinds of acts or arrangements
it would preclude. Perhaps this limitation approximates the one
expressed more, recently in the now famous remarks made in 1929
by Charles Evans Hughes, erstwhile Secretary of State and already
designated Chief Justice of the United States:
What is the power to make a treaty? What is the object of
the power? The normal scope of the power can be found in
the appropriate object of the power. The power is to deal
with foreign nations with regard to matters of international
concern. It is not a power intended to be exercised, it may be
assumed, with respect to matters that have no relation to
international concerns.
So I come back to the suggestion I made at the start,
that this is a sovereign nation; from my point of view the
nation has the power to make any agreement whatever in a
constitutional manner that relates to the conduct of .our
international relations, unless there can be found some express
prohibition in the Constitution, and I am not aware of any
which would in any way detract from the power as I have
defined it in connection with our relations with other
governments. But if we attempted to use the treaty-making
51 "We must consider what this country has become in deciding what that [Tenth]
Amendment has reserved." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
52
See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
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power to deal with matters which did not pertain to our
external relations but to control matters which normally
and appropriately were within the local jurisdictions of the
States, then I again say there might be ground for implying
a limitation upon the treaty-making power that it is intended
for the purpose of having treaties made relating to foreign
affairs and not to make laws for the people of the United
States in their internal concerns through the exercise of the
asserted treaty-making power.5 3
Hughes' remarks were extemporaneous, perhaps even impromptu,
not a carefully prepared statement of constitutional doctrine. 4 He was
setting forth the views which lay behind the position of the American
Delegation (led by Hughes) to the Sixth International Conference of
American States-that the United States "could not join" in a treaty
to establish uniform principles of private international law,5 5 a position
challenged by some leading international lawyers.56 A year earlier,
in the same forum, Hughes had attempted to justify this position on
grounds that smacked of "reserved rights of states," and seemed not
to take full account of Missouri v. Holland.57 The 1929 remarks
quoted above still retained tenth amendment undertones which the
Court that decided Missouri v. Holland might have rejected. 5 The
new emphasis on "international concern" and "relation to foreign
PROC. Am. SOC!Y INT'L L. 194, 195-96 (1929).
4He spoke in response to urging from the floor that he express his views. Id. at
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inthe United States, with our fortyeight states and our federal government of limited powers, the United States
could not join in this action, but it viewed with sympathetic interest the efforts
of the other American states to obtain legislative uniformity.
Hughes, The Outlook for Pan Americanisn-Some Observations on the Sixth International Conference of American States, 22 PRoc. Am. Soc'Y INTI' L. 1, 12 (1928).
His comments in subsequent discussion suggest that in his view the United States
could not adhere to the Bustamante Code because of a combination of constitutional
and political obstacles. Id. at 61-62.
The official declaration of the American delegation stated in part:
The Delegation of the United States of America regrets very much that it is
unable at the present time to approve the Code of Dr. Bustamante, as in view
of the Constitution of the United States of America, the relations among the
states members of the Union and the powers and functions of the Federal
Government, it finds it very difficult to do so.
55 In view of our system of government

PAN AMERICAN UNION, TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS SIGNED AT THE: SIXTH INTERNATioNAL CONFER NcE OF AmERICAN STATES 36, 69 (1950).
5
6 For example, Professor Manley 0. Hudson, 22 PROC. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 60
(1928), and Charles H. Butler, 23 PRoc. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 177 (1929).

5722 PRoc. Am. So'Y INT'L L. 61-62 (1928); see Hudson's remarks, id. at 60.
It is clear that there was, at that time, a lag in the State Department's appreciation
of the implications of Missouri v. Holland. See note 32 supra and note 63 infra.
5
E.g., Hughes' statement: "But if we attempted to use the treaty making power
... to control matters which normally and appropriately were within the local jurisdiction of the States.... ." 23 PRoc. Am.Soc'Y INT'L L. 196 (1929).
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affairs" might also be suspect if these phrases were interpreted to
preclude American adherence to a code of private international law.59
Still, whatever the origins or context of Hughes' statement, its
principal elements have been commonly accepted as sound constitutional doctrine. The Restatement on the Law of American Foreign
Relations has made Hughes' doctrine (if not Jefferson's) "black letter
law." " Students are now taught that a treaty would be invalid not
only if it were inconsistent with the Bill of Rights or other provisions
of the Constitution, but also if it dealt with a matter which was not
of "international concern." There has been less agreement on what
this limitation means.
II

Whatever Hughes had in mind, the scope of the constitutional
limitation he proposed must derive from its constitutional underpinnings and rationale. The doctrine is commonly described as requiring that treaties deal with matters of "international concern."
There might have been less confusion if the doctrine had been put forth
as a requirement that treaties bear a "relation to American foreign
affairs," another phrase which Hughes employed.' Whatever phrase
is used, the implied constitutional limitation derives from the view
that the treaty power is a foreign relations power, and means that
treaties must have a foreign relations purpose.
One may conclude, then, that the Constitution would bar some
mala fide use of the form of a treaty, in conspiracy with a foreign
power, for the sole purpose of making domestic law in the United
59 In further discussion of the Bustamante Code on private international law during the 1929 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, Hughes
admitted that "doubtless there were many matters considered which were not entirely
of local concern," and he recognized, in general, that there may be concerns "which
perhaps under former conditions had been entirely local, [but which] had become so
related to international matters that an international regulation could not appropriately
succeed without embracing the local affairs as well." 23 PROc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 195
(1929). But he implied that some aspects of the conflicts enterprise might be of
strictly local interest, and that merely to achieve uniformity of practice within different
nations might not be a proper subject of a treaty. Id. But see note 63 infra.
I have
60 RESTA=ENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RATIoNs LAw § 117 (1965).
assumed that Jefferson's statement and Hughes' are generally equivalent. If there is
any difference between the requirement that a treaty "concern the other party" and
that it be of "international concern," the difference does not seem relevant for our
purpose. Suggestions that there are relevant differences betveen "international concern" and "multi-national concern" are not persuasive. If, as I believe, the justification for any "international concern" limitation derives from the purpose of the treaty
power, the real test should be whether a treaty is entered into as an act of foreign
policy in pursuance of American foreign relations. See note 61 infra.
0
1When Hughes spoke of this question after he became Chief Justce he spoke of
"all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign relations." Santovincenzo v. Egan,
284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931).
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States-whether to exclude the House of Representatives or to invade
the reserved jurisdiction of the states. Assume the President (and
Senate) wish to establish a uniform divorce law in the United States;
a friendly foreign government agrees to help by entering into a
"treaty" with the United States establishing a divorce law for this
country. It would be simple in that case to declare the label of treaty
a sham, to disregard the formalities of treaty-making, and to declare
that "treaty" inoperative as law in the United States. Such a hypothetical conspiracy apart, it is difficult to imagine the circumstances in
which the United States and one or more nations would negotiate and
conclude a treaty that does not concern them both, that does not involve
the foreign relations of the United States, and that does not serve its
Hughes' concern, and Jefferson's, then, may be
foreign policy.'
largely academic. Surely, there is no warrant for extending and distorting the constitutional doctrine they suggest merely to render it less
academic and make it a serious limitation.
In any event, Hughes' doubts about a treaty on private international law in 1928 or 1929 have little relevance for human rights
conventions today. What is of international concern, what affects
American foreign relations and is relevant to American foreign policy,
what matters the United States wishes to negotiate about, differ from
generation to generation, perhaps from year to year, with the everchanging character of relations between nations.' If there is a constitutional requirement that a treaty deal with a matter of "international
concern," that it be an act of American foreign policy in the conduct
of American foreign relations, surely human rights conventions today
amply satisfy that requirement. Minimum standards of international
behavior with regard to human rights were a matter of international
concern and involved American foreign relations long before the UN
62
Even the case that inspired Hughes' concern hardly affords a realistic example.
Theoretically, his principle might bar treaties which develop "uniform laws" where
neither the United States nor the other party has any substantial interest in whether
or not their countries have such uniform laws. But even if nations should bother to
have their experts join to develop those uniform laws, they would hardly incorporate
such laws in a treaty unless they had some foreign-policy interest in common standards,
in binding other nations to these standards, and were willing to bind themselves in
exchange. But see note 63 infra. For a discussion of some different kinds of concerns that may lead nations to negotiate a treaty or include a particular provision,

see Niagara Reservation 1164-69.
63 The agreement that troubled Hughes affords an interesting instance. Whatever
might have been the case in 1928, I am confident that today a treaty providing for
uniform principles of private international law in regard to cases of conflicts of law
between nations would be a valid treaty dealing with a matter of international concern. In recent years the United States has adhered to the Hague Conference on
Private International Law. Today, principles of conflicts of law between nations are
probably subject to federal, not state, law, precisely because they affect the foreign
relations of the United States. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 425-26 (1964); Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts:
Sabbatino, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 805, 820-21 n.51 (1964).
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Charter expressly so provided. Questions of human rights, and the
desirability of international legislation of minimum standards, are
issues of foreign policy facing all nations today. None of them is
asserting that it is not an appropriate subject for international agreement. For the United States such agreements are not "sham" treaties
contrived by the President to distort our constitutional system of
separation of powers, or to take additional matters from the jurisdiction
of the states into the federal domain."4 As in all bona fide treaties,
their purpose, from the point of view of the United States, is a foreign
relations purpose-to influence behavior of other countries which
affects the welfare of this country. The concern of the United States
is not wholly moral or humanitarian. This country would like to see
minimum standards observed in other countries in order to safeguard
our own standards and to promote conditions that are conducive to
American prosperity and American interests in international peace and
security. To achieve those aims, and to give the United States the
right to request compliance with those standards, the United States is
prepared to pay the price of undertaking to apply similar standards at
home and to recognize the right of other nations to demand American
compliance.
It should be clear, moreover, that nothing in the requirement that
a treaty deal with a matter of "international concern," or that it "affect
American foreign relations," bars an agreement in which the United
States undertakes obligations to other states as to how it will treat
its own inhabitants:
[I]t has always been clear that international agreements, like
private contracts, may be parallel as well as reciprocal. Parties may bind themselves to do, or not to do, for each other;
or, a nation may undertake to do or not to do, in its own
land and to its own people, in consideration of a similar
undertaking by the other party....
Such agreements are not entirely recent phenomena
. In fact, the United States, like other nations, has
...
itself negotiated treaties and other international agreements
which regulate acts of the Government in regard to its own
citizens. The United States adhered to ILO Conventions
establishing labor standards which this country would apply to
Americans. It agreed to control raw and manufactured
opium and other drugs within the United States. It agreed
to apply to its own vessels accepted load lines and common
standards for safety at sea. It agreed not to bring to trial
,4 In most respects, at least, the subjects with which such treaties generally deal
are already in the federal domain, and do not make new law, but only confirm what is
already federal law. See note 66 iltfra.
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an American soldier if he had been tried for the same offence
by the courts of an allied NATO country. It agreed with
other nations to limit its taxes on American citizens. And
the United States has agreed to limit its own armaments; it
continues to strive for far-reaching controls on arms and
armies which would impose strict limitations on activities by
Americans within the United States; it sought, for years,
agreement for the control of atomic energy which would have
governed strictly many domestic activities by Americans in
the United States. 5
The foreign relations aspects of these "parallel" agreements are
obvious, and the international character of human rights conventions
should be equally apparent. An international convention fixing high
labor standards for a nation's own inhabitants, adopted by the nations
with whom the United States competes in the sale of manufactured
goods in world markets, would have a greater impact on American
foreign trade, and be of far greater "international concern" to this
country, than any "parallel" treaty formulating common shipping
standards and restrictions. To recognize that even human rights may
be matters of authentic international concern, one need only think of
apartheid in South Africa, of recent events in communist countries, in
Nigeria, in India and Pakistan, in Cyprus, and of other actual or potential situations where the treatment of individuals or minority groups is
intimately related to war and peace among nations."
Basically, the
65 Law of the Land 911-12 (footnotes omitted).
Opponents of human rights conventions have also invoked Power Authority v.
FPC, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot, sub norn. American Pub. Power
Ass'n v. Power Authority, 355 U.S. 64 (1957). That case, I believe, was wrongly
decided. See Niagara Reservation, passim. In any event, it has no relevance to our
question. That case held that a Senate reservation to a treaty with Canada, providing
that the treaty would not go into effect in the United States until Congress adopted
legislation, did not have the effect of law in the United States since it was not part
of the contract with Canada. That case suggests that only provisions that are "contractual," i.e., part of the agreement with the foreign nation, can be law of the land.
Nothing in that case suggests any limitations on the kinds of provisions that can be
made subject of a contract with other nations. In a human rights convention, the
provisions are "contractual," imposing obligations upon the parties.
The majority opinion in the case adopted the views of Professor Jessup, counsel
for the Power Authority in the case, and author of a legal memorandum published
earlier on the same issues. Professor Jessup has been one of the leading exponents
of the position which would have the individual a subject of international law, and has
expressly favored multilateral conventions to promote human rights. P. JEssup,
A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 87-93 (1948).
16 Even minor agreements have a foreign relations purpose. In 1963 President
Kennedy asked the advice and consent of the Senate to three United Nations conventions dealing with the abolition of slavery, the abolition of forced labor, and the
enforcement of political rights of women. He said:
United States law is, of course, already in conformity with these conventions, and ratification would not require any change in our domestic
legislation. However, the fact that our Constitution already assures us of
these rights does not entitle us to stand aloof from documents which project

1028

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.116:1012

question is not whether the United States should legislate for its own
citizens by treaty, or should submit actions in the United States to the
scrutiny of other nations. Rather, the question is whether the United
States, concerned with the treatment of individuals in other countries
and its effect on international peace and security, may seek to regulate
such treatment, and thinks it worth the necessary price-agreement to
subject actions in this country to similar international or foreign
scrutiny.
To suggest that human rights conventions are not of "international
concern" or do not "affect American foreign relations" requires some
special and narrow restriction of the natural meaning of those phrases.
It necessitates a new doctrine holding that a treaty must affect
American foreign relations in a particular way, that it further only
certain kinds of foreign relations interests, and further them only in
specific ways. I know of no basis for any such limitation on the
treaty power: Jefferson did not suggest it; Hughes' remarks have
no suspicion of it; none of the dicta of the Court states or implies it.
No one during the Bricker controversy, on either side, ever intimated
it; indeed, such a constitutional doctrine would have made Senator
Bricker's struggles to amend the Constitution largely unnecessary,
legally as well as politically. Most important, there is no basis for
any such limitation on the treaty power in the only possible foundation
for any such limitation-the requirement that a treaty be a bona fide
agreement in pursuit of foreign policy objectives.
Perhaps some of the misunderstanding of "international concern"
and "relation to American foreign policy" has resulted because some
have confused that doctrine with the very different concept of "domestic
jurisdiction." In part, responsibility for this confusion may be traced
to the original Circular 175,67 promulgated by Secretary of State
our own heritage on an international scale. The day-to-day unfolding of
events makes it ever clearer that our own welfare is interrelated with the
rights and freedoms assured the peoples of other nations.
These conventions deal with human rights which may not yet be secure
in other countries; they have provided models for the drafters of constitutions
and laws in newly independent nations; and they have influenced the policies
of governments preparing to accede to them. Thus, they involve current
problems in many countries.
They will stand as a sharp reminder of world opinion to all who may
seek to violate the human rights they define. They also serve as a continuous
commitment to respect these rights. There is no society so advanced that it
no longer needs periodic recommitment to human rights.
The United States cannot afford to renounce responsibility for support of
the very fundamentals which distinguish our concept of government from all
forms of tyranny.
Hearings on Human Rights Conventions Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on

Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1967).
87 U.S. Dep't of State, Dep't Cir. No. 175 (1955), reprinted in 50 Am. J.
784 (1956).
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Dulles apparently in an effort to console the Bricker forces after the
defeat of their efforts to amend the Constitution." The Circular-an
instruction to the State Department-provided:
Treaties should be designed to promote United States
interests by securing action by foreign governments in a way
deemed advantageous to the United States. Treaties are not
to be used as a device for the purpose of effecting internal
social changes or to try to circumvent the constitutional
procedures established in relation to what are essentially
matters of domestic concern.'
The Circular, it should be noted, announced policy, not constitutional doctrine. Indeed, it was probably designed to impose as policy
what the Bricker Amendment would have imposed as constitutional
law, but which, it was realized, was not the law of the Constitution
unamended. 70 Still, the final clause of the Circular has apparently led
some to argue that the Constitution precludes American adherence to
any treaty that deals with matters "that are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States." 71
Whatever its intellectual origins, the argument reflects fundamental
misconceptions. The concept of "domestic jurisdiction" is unknown
to American constitutional doctrine; it is well known to international
law.7" Under international law, a matter is deemed to be within a
68

For other reassurances to the Brickerites, see Law of the Land 934-35 n.66.

69U.S. Dep't of State, Dep't Cir. No. 175, at 2 (1955). The Circular, in turn,
echoes remarks made by Dulles two years earlier during the hearings on the Bricker
Amendment. See Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.1. Res. 43 Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on the Jutdiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 824-25 (1953). The circular has
since been revised and the quoted language eliminated.
71 In fact, when President Kennedy in 1963 sent three minor human rights conventions to the Senate, see note 66 supra, it did eventually consent to one of them.
113 CONG. REc. 15750-51 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1967) (consent to convention on abolition
of slavery).
71 American Bar Association, Report of the Standing Committee on Peace and
Law Through United Nations: Human Rights Conventions and Recominendations,
1 INT'L LAw. 600, 601 (1967). Note that the Circular, supra note 69, speaks of
"domestic concern," not of "domestic jurisdiction." The latter has became a term of
art in international law; the former has not. See notes 72-74 infra and accompanying
text. The Circular may have intended to use "domestic concern" in contradistinction
to Hughes' "international concern." In fact, this is a misleading play on words.
"Domestic concern" and "international concern" are not closed, exclusive categories.
To say that something is essentially a matter of domestic concern may be merely a
way of expressing a determination not to negotiate about it. But what is essentially
a matter of "domestic concern" becomes a matter of "international concern" if nations
do, in fact, decide to bargain about it. See note 75 infra.
72 Compare U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7, with Declaration on the Part of the
United States, 61 Stat. 1218 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1598 (promulgated Aug. 14, 1946),
in which the United States accepted, with reservations, compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice under I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, para. 2. One of the stipulated exceptions related to ". . . disputes with regard to matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the
United States of America. . . " Declaration on the Part of the United States, supra.
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country's domestic jurisdiction if it is not governed by international
law or by any treaty obligation." What is within the domestic jurisdiction of a country in the absence of treaty ceases to be so when that
nation enters an international agreement on the subject.' To suggest
that the Constitution forbids treaties as to matters that are "essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States," is to bar any
treaty on any matter not already governed by customary international
law or previous agreement. Such a theory would prevent the United
States from participating in the development of new law by multilateral
convention-the principal form of international legislation today. It
would preclude many provisions in treaties of commerce, friendship
and navigation, in treaties on disarmament, extradition, nationality, the
prevention of double taxation and a host of other subjects. It seems
patently absurd. 5 In any event, it is a limitation which no one has
suggested before and which is without foundation. It cannot be implied in Hughes' "international concern" limitation, nor can it be derived from the character and purpose of the treaty power as an instrument of foreign relations; it has no support even in early writings on
the Constitution; and it is contradicted by the history of American
treaty practice. In the absence of treaty, this country's armaments, its
nationality laws, its immigration policies, all lie within its "domestic
jurisdiction;" yet the United States has negotiated agreements on
these subjects of international concern from the beginning of its history
to this day.
III
Today, human rights are of deep "international concern"; they
have an important place in the foreign relations of the United States.
Human rights in other countries have become, ineluctably, this country's
business. It has repeatedly joined with other nations to condemn
invasions of human rights in communist countries as well as in South
Africa. For the United States to insist that a nation's treatment of
its own inhabitants is not of international concern would itself have
grievous impact on American foreign relations with Asian and
73
See, e.g., Declaration on the Part of the United States, 61 Stat. 1218 (1946),
T.I.A.S. No. 1598 (promulgated Aug. 14, 1946).

T4 See Advisory Opinion on Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco,
[1923] P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 4.

75 The authors of this argument might insist that they are using "domestic jurisdiction" in some special sense. I do not know what it is. It would seem that they
are trying by this phrase to read back into the Constitution the notion that a treaty
may not deal with a "local matter"-a notion long rejected and finally demolished in
Missauri v. Holland. The point is that the concept of "domestic jurisdiction" is
irrelevant to the constitutional question whether an agreement relates to our foreign
relations and has some foreign policy purpose.
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African countries. The state of human rights in the United States, in
turn, is sharply scrutinized by others, and our domestic human rights
policies are developed with at least one eye and one ear to the world
outside. For decades now, "in the ordinary intercourse of nations,"
human rights have "been made subjects of negotiation and treaty."
Surely, the Constitution does not prohibit the United States from
negotiating and adhering to such treaties.
Beneath the "neo-Bricker" doctrine that would deny the United
States the power to adhere to such treaties lies, perhaps, the view that
the United States should not be negotiating with other nations on
"internal matters," whether those of South Africa, Russia, Hitler's
Germany, Castro's Cuba, or the United States. That is a view of
foreign relations which this country rejected almost 100 years ago.
Today such a foreign policy is impossible, even were it desirable. The
United States cannot avoid involvement in such "internal affairs" of
other countries and it cannot keep other nations out of ours. The price
of international influence and concern is reciprocity. Indeed, the price
of United States leadership in world affairs may involve our own
"internal affairs" in our foreign relations even more than the "internal
affairs" of others.
Constitutional interpretation has, for more than thirty years,
favored the broadest construction of the power to govern. The
Supreme Court long ago recognized that where power is granted it
may be exercised to the fullest. No court today would say that the
commerce power is limited to matters which affect commerce in one
particular way or to a limited degree; indeed, it has been extended
farther than ever to support new departures in human rights legislation
in the United StatesY The spending power has emerged as a principal
instrument for promoting general welfare, including much that comes
A hundred years
within contemporary conceptions of human rights.
read to warrant
is
being
amendment
after its adoption, the fourteenth
novel and far-reaching legislation to promote human rights in the
United States. 78 It is difficult to believe that any court would insist on
a more grudging and niggardly view of the treaty power in order to
prohibit American participation in human rights conventions. It is
difficult to believe that any court would find that the Constitution
renders the United States impotent to do what all other nations can
do-participate in one of the major developments of international life
76

E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) ; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
77 See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
78E.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See also United States v.
Guest%383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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in the last half-century. It is difficult to believe that any court would
find in the Constitution a requirement that treaties deal with matters of
"international concern," or "affect the foreign relations" of the United
States, in some special narrow sense unrelated to the realities of international intercourse today.
There is room for difference about the desirability or effectiveness
of international human rights covenants, or of American participation
in such covenants. There is, however, no excuse for lawyers to
fabricate constitutional doctrine to confuse the issue. Almost ten years
ago, in the pages of this Review, I wrote:
Many will have deep sympathy for those who dream of
old days thought good, or better; who yearn for decentralization even in foreign affairs and matters of international concern, for limitations on federal power, for increase in the
importance of the States; who thrill to a wild, poignant,
romantic wish to turn back all the clocks, to unlearn the
learnings, until the atom is unsplit, weapons unforged, oceans
unnarrowed, the Civil War unfought. The wish remains
idle, and the effort to diminish power in this area for fear that
it may not be used wisely is quixotic, if not suicidal. It is not
the moment to attempt it when all ability, flexibility, wisdom
are needed for cooperation for survival by a frightened race,
on a diminishing earth, reaching for the moon.7"
The lesson is more urgent than ever; it is yet to be learned.
79 Law of the Land 936.

